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ON PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE GENERALIZED GAMES
ALVARO J. RIASCOS VILLEGAS AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of
them are atomic. Objective functions are continuous and admissible strategies may depend on the
actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-
atomic players. When atomic players have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave
objective functions, a pure strategy Nash equilibria always exists.
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1. Introduction
Schmeidler (1973) proved that in non-convex games with a continuum of players the set of pure
strategy equilibria is non-empty provided that (i) all agents are non-atomic, and (ii) objective
functions depend only on their own strategy and on the average of the actions chosen by the other
players. These assumptions convexifies the game, as the integral of any correspondence is a convex
set (Aumann (1965)).
In this paper, we extend Schmeidler’s result to large generalized games with a finite number of
atomic players. In our framework, both objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on
the strategies of atomic players and on messages which aggregate information about strategies chosen
by non-atomic players (i.e., not necessarily on the average of these actions). By extending the proof
given by Rath (1992, Theorem 2) of Schmeidler (1973) classical result, we provide a short and direct
proof of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in large generalized games. Our theorem generalizes
substantially Schmeidler (1973, Theorem 2) and Rath (1992, Theorem 2) to generalized games with
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2compact metric action spaces and doesn’t rely on purification of mixed strategy equilibria. Still,
our theorem is a special case of Balder (1999,2002) but our proof is much simpler.1
2. Pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games
Let G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , H) be a generalized game with an infinite set of players T = T1 ∪ T2.
The set of players T1 is a non-empty and compact metric space endowed with a σ-algebra Σ and
a finite non-atomic measure λ such that (T1,Σ, λ) is a complete measure space. Each player t ∈ T1
has a closed and non-empty action space Kt ⊆ K̂, where K̂ is a compact metric space.2 A profile
of actions for players in T1 is any function f : T1 → K̂ such that f(t) ∈ Kt, for any t ∈ T1.
There is a finite set T2 of atomic players. Each t ∈ T2 has a non-empty, closed and convex action
space Kt ⊆ K̂t, where K̂t is a compact Frechet space.3 Since T2 is finite, a profile of actions for the
players in T2 is a vector a := (at; t ∈ T2) ∈
∏
t∈T2
Kt.
Let F(Ti) be the space of all profiles of actions for players in Ti, with i ∈ {0, 1}. Also, given
t ∈ T2, let F−t(T2) be the set of profiles of actions a−t := (aj ; j ∈ T2 \ {t}) for players in T2 \ {t}.
Actions chosen by non-atomic players are not necessarily advanced by the participants in the
game. However, when making a decision, players will consider aggregate information of some char-
acteristics of these actions. Thus, given an action profile of non-atomic players f ∈ F(T1), each
player in T will only take into account, for strategic purposes, aggregate information coded through
the message m(f) :=
∫
T1
H(t, f(t))dλ, where H : T1 × K̂ → Rl is a continuous function.
Since we want to concentrate on action profiles for which messages are well defined, we say that
f is a strategic profile of players in T1 if both f ∈ F(T1) and H(·, f(·)) is a Σ-measurable function.4
Measurability restrictions are not necessary over the behavior of atomic players. For this reason,
the set of strategic profiles of players in T2 coincides with F(T2).
The set of messages associated with strategic profiles of non-atomic players is given by
M =

∫
T1
H(t, f(t))dλ : f ∈ F(T1) ∧ H(·, f(·)) is Σ-measurable
 ⊆ Rl.5
1Below we point out the main difference.
2This is the most relavant distinction with Balder (1999). While we assume all non-atomic action spaces to be
uniformly contained in a compact metric space K̂, he gets rid of this important restriccion. It follows that in our
model, non-atomic agents strategic profiles are integrable, a strong assumption in standard applications.
3That is, it is a non-empty and compact metrizable locally convex topological vector space
4In other words, for every Borelian set E ⊆ Rl we have that {t ∈ T1 : H(t, f(t)) ∈ E} ∈ Σ.
5Notice that, since K̂ and T1 are compact metric spaces and H is continuous, for any profile of actions f : T1 → K̂
the function H(·, f(·)) : T1 → Rl is bounded. As T1 has finite measure, if H(·, f(·)) is measurable, then it is integrable.
For this reason, in the definition of M we only require measurability of H(·, f(·)).
3The messages about the strategic profiles of players in T1 jointly with the strategic profiles of
players in T2 may restrict the set of admissible strategies available for a player t ∈ T . That is,
given a vector (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2) the strategies available for a player t ∈ T1 are given by a set
Γt(m, a) ⊆ K̂, where Γt : M × F(T2)  Kt is a continuous correspondence with non-empty and
compact values. Analogously, given (m, a−t) ∈ M × F−t(T2), the set of strategies available for a
player t ∈ T2 is Γt(m, a−t) ⊆ Kt, where Γt : M×F−t(T2)  Kt is a continuous correspondence with
non-empty, compact and convex values. We refer to correspondences (Γt; t ∈ T ) as correspondences
of admissible strategies. We assume that, for any (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2), the correspondence that
associates to any non-atomic player t ∈ T1 the set of admissible strategies Γt(m, a) is measurable.
Given a topological space A, let U(A) be the collection of continuous functions u : A → R.
Assume that U(A) is endowed with the sup norm topology. We suppose that each player t ∈ T1 has
an objective function ut ∈ U(K̂ ×M × F(T2)), and each player t ∈ T2 has an objective function
ut ∈ U(M×F(T2)) which is quasi-concave in its own strategy. Finally, we assume that the mapping
U : T1 → U(K̂ ×M × F(T2)) defined by U(t) = ut is measurable. 6
Definition. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the large generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , H)
is given by feasible strategic profiles (f∗, a∗) ∈ F(T1)×F(T2) such that,
ut(f
∗(t),m(f∗), a∗) ≥ ut(f,m(f∗), a∗), ∀f ∈ Γt(m(f∗), a∗), ∀t ∈ T1;
ut(m(f
∗), a∗t , a
∗
−t) ≥ ut(m(f∗), a, a∗−t), ∀a ∈ Γt(m(f∗), a∗−t), ∀t ∈ T2.
Theorem 1. Any generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , H) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We divide the proof into four steps.
(1) The space of messages M ⊂ Rl is non-empty, compact and convex . Since for any (m, a) ∈
M × F(T2) the correspondence that associates to any t ∈ T1 the set Γt(m, a) is measurable, it
follows from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 14.85, page 504) that this correspondence has
a Σ × B(K̂)-measurable graph. Thus, it follows from Aumann’s Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis
and Border (2006, Theorem 18.26, page 608)) that there exists a Σ-measurable function g : T1 → K̂
such that, g(t) ∈ Γt(m, a) ⊆ Kt, ∀t ∈ T1. Hence,
∫
T1
H(t, g(t))dλ is well defined and, therefore, M
is non-empty. Since the integral of a correspondence in a non-atomic measurable space is a convex
6Suppose that there is a finite number of types on the set of non-atomic agents, T1. That is, there is a finite
partition of T1 into measurable sets {I1, . . . , Ir} such that, two players belonging into the same element of the partition
are identical. In this case, the restriction about measurability of U is trivially satisfied.
4set (see Aumann (1965, Theorem 1)), we conclude that M is convex. Indeed, let Q : T1  Rl
defined by Q(t) = H(t,Kt), for any t ∈ T1. Then M =
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ is convex.7
Let Q˜ : T1  Rl be the correspondence defined by Q˜(t) = H(T1, K̂), for any t ∈ T1. Then
M =
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ ⊆ ∫
T1
Q˜(t)dλ = convexhull(H(T1, K̂)). Therefore, since H is continuous, M is a subset
of a compact set. Thus, to guarantee that M is compact it remains to prove that M is closed. Let
{mk}k∈N ⊆ M be a sequence that converges to a vector m ∈ Rl. Since mk ∈ M , mk =
∫
T1
hk(t)dλ,
where hk : T1 → Rl is a mesurable function and hk = H(·, fk(·)) for some fk ∈ F(T1). For each t,
{H(t, fk(t))}k∈N ⊆ Q(t), which is a compact set. Thus, every limit point of {hk(t)}k∈N is contained
in Q(t). Also, since H is continuous, T1 is compact, and
⋃
t∈T1
Kt ⊆ K̂, it is easy to see that {hk}k∈N
is uniformly bounded by an integrable function. By Aumann (1976), the limit point of
∫
T1
hk(t)dλ
belongs to
∫
T1
Q(t)dλ. Therefore, the space of messages M is compact.
(2) Best-reply correspondences are closed with non-empty and compact values. Furthermore, atomic
players’ best-reply correspondences have convex values.
Given t ∈ T1, let Bt : M × F(T2)  Kt with Bt(m, a) = argmax
f(t)∈Γt(m,a)
ut(f(t),m, a) be the best-
reply correspondence of non-atomic layer t. Analogously, for any atomic player t ∈ T2, his best-
reply correspondence Bt : M ×F−t(T2)  Kt is defined by Bt(m, a−t) = argmax
at∈Γt(m,a−t)
ut(m, at, a−t).
As a consequence of Berge’s Maximum Theorem, best-reply correspondences have closed graph
and non-empty compact values. Moreover, the convexity of admissible strategies correspondences,
jointly with the quasi-concavity of objective functions, guarantee that atomic players’ best-reply
correspondences have convex values.
(3) The correspondence Ω(m, a) :=
∫
T1
H(t, Bt(m, a))dλ is closed, non-empty and convex valued.
Given (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2), by assumption the correspondence Φ(m,a) : T1  K̂ defined by
Φ(m,a)(t) = Γt(m, a) is measurable and has non-empty and compact values. By the Measurable
Maximum Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 18.19, page 605)) the mapping
t H(t, Bt(m, a)) has a measurable selector. Therefore, Ω has non-empty values.
The correspondence Ω has convex values, since for any (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2), the set Ω(m, a) is
the integral of the correspondence t H(t, Bt(m, a)).
Fix t ∈ T1. Since Bt has closed graph, the correspondence that associate to each (m, a) ∈
M×F(T2) the set H(t, Bt(m, a)) has closed graph too.8 On the other hand, since T1×K̂ is compact
and H is continuous, there is a bounded function v : T1 → Rl such that −v(t) ≤ H(t, f(t)) ≤ v(t),
for any t ∈ T1, f ∈ F(T1) and
∫
T1
v(t)dλ is finite. Therefore, the correspondence that associates to
7This follow immediately from the definition of integral of a correspondence (Aumann (1965)) and the fact that
we do not require action profiles to be measurable.
8It is a direct consequence of the continuity of H and the fact that Bt(m,a) ⊆ K̂ for any (t,m, a) ∈ T1×M×F(T2).
5each (m, a) ∈ M × F(T2) the integral on T1 of the correspondence t  H(t, Bt(m, a)) has closed
graph (a consequence of the main result in Aumann (1976)). In other words, Ω is closed.
(4) The generalized game G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , H) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Define Γ : M ×F(T2) M ×F(T2) by Γ(m, a) = (Ω(m, a), (Bt(m, a−t))t∈T2). Then Γ is closed
and has nonempty, convex and compact values. Applying Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, we
conclude that Γ has a fixed point, i.e. there exists (m∗, a∗) ∈ M × F(T2) such that (m∗, a∗) ∈
Γ(m∗, a∗). That is, for some f∗ ∈ F(T1), m∗ =
∫
T1
H(t, f∗(t))dλ and f∗(t) ∈ Bt(m∗, a∗), for any
t ∈ T1. Also, for any t ∈ T2, a∗t ∈ Bt(m∗, a∗−t). These properties ensure that (f∗, a∗) is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of G(T, (Kt,Γt, ut)t∈T , H). 
There are generalizations of our results that are quite straightforward. For example, similar
arguments to those made in Remark 6 in Rath’s article would allow us to avoid fixing a topology over
the space of objective functions. On the other hand, we could also relax the continuity hypothesis
of our coding function H. In particular, as in Balder (1999, 2002), we could assume that H is a
vector valued function of Carathe´odory functions.
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